We present a fuzzy version of the Group Identification Problem ("Who is a J?") introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997). We consider a class N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, each one with an opinion about the membership to a group J of the members of the society, consisting in a function p i : N → [0, 1], indicating for each agent, including herself, the degree of membership to J. We consider the problem of aggregating those functions, satisfying different sets of axioms and characterizating different aggregators. While some results are analogous to those of the originally crisp model, the fuzzy version is able to overcome some of the main impossibility results of Kasher and Rubinstein. all other cases). Consider, also w.l.g. the profile
Introduction
People usually classifies other people, objects or entities in groups. Sometimes these classifications are obvious, as in the assignment of countries to the continent to which they belong. But in many cases, opinions may not be even clear cut and thus it becomes hard to reach a consensus. For instance, if a group of people wants to identify which of them should be considered "tall", finding out whether a member is such may be far from evident. Of course, a consensus could be reached on that people that are 2.00 meters height or more are "tall". But it is not clear whether someone who's height is 1.75 meters can be considered "tall". This kind of classification problems, prone to vagueness and imprecision, gave the impetus for the introduction of fuzzy sets. Zadeh (1965) defined a fuzzy subset U of a set A as a membership function f : A → [0, 1], where f (a) indicates the degree of membership of a in U. This allows to represent, in particular, preferences as degrees. In turn, there are several approaches to the aggregation of fuzzy preferences. Just to mention older contributions, (Dutta et al., 1987) deal with exact choices under vague preferences while (Dutta, 1986) investigates the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules determining fuzzy social orderings. In this paper we introduce a fuzzy approach to the group identification problem formalized by Kasher and Rubinstein (K-R) in "Who is a J?" (1997) . They consider a finite society that has to determine which of its subsets of members consists of exactly those individuals that can be deemed to be Js. By a slight abuse of language, this subset is denoted J. Each different set of axioms postulated to yield a solution to this problem characterizes a class of aggregation functions, called Collective Identity Functions (CIFs) . The "Liberal" one labels as a J any individual that deems himself to be a J; the "Dictatorial" CIF is such that a single individual decides who is a J. Finally, the "Oligarchic" CIF determines that somebody is a J if all the members of a given group agree on that. Since K-R, the group identification problem in a crisp setting has been approached in many ways. Sung and Dimitrov (2005) , refine the characterization of the liberal CIF, Miller (2008) study the problem of defining more than two groups, Saporiti and Cho (2017) analyze the incentives of voters in an incomplete preferences setting, etc. In our model, every agent, instead of labeling any of the individuals in N = {1, . . . , n} (the society) as belonging or not to J, assigns a value in the [0, 1] interval to each agent, representing the degree in which that agent is believed to belong to J. The axioms in K-R have counterparts in our framework. On the other hand, we also consider another axiom drawn from the literature, namely the Extreme Liberalism axiom (Fioravanti-Tohmé, 2018) . We present fuzzy versions of those crisp axioms. We deal first with the axioms defining the "Liberal" aggregator, showing that the fuzzy versions of the results in K-R remain valid. But when we turn to the axioms defining the Dictatorial aggregator, our results differ from those in the crisp setting. More specifically, K-R prove an impossibility result when the domain and the range of the aggregator are restricted, indicating that the Dictatorial CIF is the only one satisfying those conditions. But there does not exist a clear "translation" of those restrictions into our framework, allowing different interpretations. In some of these we obtain more aggregators verifying the axioms, while in others there does not exist any of them. Fuzzy settings of this problem have been studied several times in the last years. So, for instance, Cho and Park (2018) present a model of group identification for more than two groups, allowing fractional opinions, while Ballester and García-Lapresta (2008) deal with fuzzy opinions in a sequential model. An interesting paper related to ours, is Alcantud and Andrés Calle (A-AC, 2017), which presents a deep analysis of the aggregation problem of fuzzy opinions yielding fuzzy subsets. This contribution introduces the Fuzzy Collective Identity Functions (FCIFs), an expression that we adopt in this paper, defining the liberal and dictatorial aggregators, among others, presenting ways of circumventing the classical impossibility result from K-R. The main difference between this and our work is that we find a characterization of the liberal FCIF, and determine different domain and range conditions according to which the impossibility result can obtain or be eluded. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to present the model and the set of axioms considered here. In Section 3 we deal with "Liberal" aggregators while in Section 4 we focus on the Dictatorial aggregator. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Model and axioms
Let N = {1, . . . n} be a set of agents that have to define who of them belongs to the group of Js (which by a slight abuse of language is denoted J). The opinion of agent i is characterized by a function p i : N → [0, 1] where p i (j) indicates the assessment of agent i of the degree of membership of j to J. Agent i has thus a vector of opinions P i = {p i (1), . . . , p i (n)}. A profile of opinions P is a n × n matrix P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }. With P we denote the set of all the profiles of opinions. A fuzzy subset J of N is characterized by a membership (characteristic) function f J : N → [0, 1], that indicates the degree of membership of an agent to J. Let F = {f J : N → [0, 1]} be the set of possible membership functions of a fuzzy subset J. We denote by FJ the Fuzzy Collective Identity Function (FCIF) such that FJ : P → F. A FCIF takes a profile of opinions and returns a membership function for the fuzzy subset J. More precisely, the membership function of the set J associated to the profile P ∈ P is denoted f P J . We do not impose further restrictions on this membership function. It can be different for every i, for example, f P
In what follows we will present in an axiomatic way the properties that a social planner would like to see implemented by a "fair" aggregation process, several of them introduced already by K-R in their seminal work. The following two axioms state that, if the opinion about an agent changes, say by increasing (decreasing) his degree of membership, then the aggregated opinion should reach at least (at most) the previous degree.
• Fuzzy Monotonicity (FMON): let P ∈ P be such that f P J (i) = a and let P ′ be a profile such that P ′ k,i > P k,i for some k with P ′ h,j = P h,j for all (h, j)
• Fuzzy Strong Monotonicity (FSMON): let P ∈ P be such that f P J (i) = a and let P ′ be a profile such that P ′ k,i > P k,i for some k with
It is easy to see that if a FCIF verifies FSMON then it satisfies FMON.
The next axiom states that the aggregate opinion about an agent is bounded by the upper and lower bounds of all the individual opinions about that agent. That is:
The following axiom states that if two agents are evaluated in a similar way, the FCIF must classify them also similarly:
• Symmetry (SYM): agents j and k are symmetric if:
Then, if two agents j and k are symmetric it follows that f P
The following property is our first true "fuzzy" axiom. It distinguishes between being more approved than disapproved: an agent that gets a membership degree of more than 0.5 can be consider to have been approved to belong to the group of Js. 2
• Fuzzy Symmetry (FSYM): agents j and k are fuzzy-symmetric if:
If two agents j and k are fuzzy-symmetric then f P
The following examples may be useful to understand the difference.
verifies FSYM but not SYM.
The next axiom states that the aggregate opinion about an agent should only take into account the individual opinions about her. The other is its "fuzzy" version.
• Independence (I): let P and P ′ be two profiles such that given an agent j ∈ N, p i (j) = p ′ i (j) for all i ∈ N. Then f P J (j) = f P ′ J (j). • Fuzzy Independence (FI): let P and P ′ be two profiles such that given an agent j ∈ N and for every i ∈ N we have
The difference between the last two axioms is that while Independence means that f J (i) = f (p 1 (i), . . . , p n (i)), FI allows every agent to be affected by the opinion about the other agents. The next two examples provide a more clear view of how this axioms affect the FCIF.
• The FCIF such that f J (i) = p 1 (i)+p 2 (i) 2 verifies I but not FI as it can be seen in profiles P = ({0.1, 0.6}, {0.6, 0.7}) and P ′ = ({0.45, 0.6}, {0.95, 0.7}).
We have that f P
verifies FI but not I.
The following axiom states that the opinion that an agent has about himself should be considered important to determine if she is considered a J.
A fuzzy version of this axiom is:
The following example shows the difference between these two axioms:
• The FCIF such that f J (i) = 1 if p i (i) = 1 and f J (i) = 0 otherwise, verifies L but not FL.
• The FCIF such that f J (i) = 0.9 if p i (i) ≥ 0.5 and f J (i) = 0.1 if p i (i) < 0.5, verifies FL but not L.
Other relevant properties concern the capacity any agent has of being determinant on the characterization as J of another one (like a parent about the religious affiliation of his kids):
• Extreme Liberalism (EL):
A fuzzy version is:
• Fuzzy Extreme Liberalism (FEL):
(i) If p i (j) ≥ 0.5 for some i, j ∈ N, then f P J (k) ≥ 0.5 for some k ∈ N. (ii) If p i (j) < 0.5 for some i, j ∈ N, then f P J (k) < 0.5 for some k ∈ N.
Some final examples illustrate the difference between these last two axioms. • A FCIF that verifies FEL but not EL: consider N = {1, 2} and f J such that f J (1) = 0.9 and f J (2) = 0.1 for every P ∈ P.
Liberalism
We define the Strong Liberal FCIF as:
It is straightforward to see that this FCIF is analogous to the Strong Liberal CIF that K-R introduced in their work. It verifies FMON, FC, FI and FL. Moreover, it is the only FCIF that verifies this set of axioms:
Theorem 1. The only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and FL is the Strong Liberal FCIF.
Proof. It is clear that the Liberal FCIF verifies these 4 axioms. Suppose there exists another FCIF satisfying them. Let P be a profile such that p i (i) ≥ 0.5 but f P J (i) < 0.5. Using FMON several times we can create a profile P ′ identical to P except that p ′ j (i) < 0.5 for all j = i, such that f P ′ J (i) < 0.5. Consider a profile P ′′ such that p ′′ i (i) ≥ 0.5 and p ′′ j (k) < 0.5 for all j, k ∈ N (except when j = k = i). By FC we have that f P ′′ J (k) < 0.5 for all k = i. So the set of agents such that f P ′′ J (k) ≥ 0.5 belongs to {∅, {i}}. Because of FL we have f P ′′ J (i) ≥ 0.5. But then we have a contradiction with FI, because agent i is treated similarly (in the sense of FI) in profiles P ′ and P ′′ but f P ′ J (i) < 0.5 and f P ′′ J (i) ≥ 0.5. This result is still valid even if we use a mixture of fuzzy and crisp axioms: From the uniqueness of the Strong Liberal FCIF we obtain the following result:
Corollary 2. If a FCIF verifies FMON, FC, FI and FL then it verifies SYM and FSYM.
From the fact that the Liberal FCIF does not verify FSMON and that FSMON implies FMON we get:
There is no FCIF that verifies FSMON, FC, FI and FL.
The following two FCIFs are the fuzzy counterparts of the Unanimity and Inclusive CIF:
• The Unanimity FCIF is defined as:
• The Inclusive FCIF is defined as:
As in the crisp case, under extreme concepts of liberalism like EL or FEL, we obtain the same uniqueness results: Theorem 2. Inc is the only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and EL (i) or FEL (i). U is the only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and EL(ii) or FEL(ii).
Proof. A similar construction as the used for proving Theorem 1 yields the proof of the two statements.
We can derive the following impossibility result from Theorem 2: 
Dictatorship
Kasher and Rubinstein use, in a section of their paper, a slightly modified version of the CIFs. They assume that there is a consensus in the society that there exists someone who is a J and someone who is not a J. Then, it follows that the only CIF (with the alternative domain and range conditions established for this case) that verifies Consensus and Independence is the Dictatorial one.
Here we define the Dictatorial FCIF with the agent j as a dictator as:
There are many ways to interpret these restrictions in our framework. One possibility is that in a profile P i , there exists at least one j such that p i (j) = 1 and one k such that p i (k) = 0. We call this set of profiles P * . An alternative set of profiles is P * * , in which for every agent i there exists at least one k and one j such that p i (k) ≥ 0.5 and p i (j) ≤ 0.5. Another possible case is that in which p i = 1 and p i = 0. We call this set P * * * . With respect to the membership functions, we can consider the case in which there exist at least one j and one k such that f J (j) = 1 and f J (k) = 0. The class of such function is denoted F * . We define F * * as the set of membership functions such that for every profile P there exists at least one k and one j such that f P J (k) ≥ 0.5 and f P J (k) ≤ 0.5. Finally we have the family of functions such that f J = 1 and f J = 0. We call this set F * * * . It is easy to verify that: P * ⊂ P * * ⊂ P * * * and F * ⊂ F * * ⊂ F * * * A social planner may require different properties to be satisfied by the domains and ranges of membership functions. Depending on those specifications, there are various possibilities:
Theorem 3. Consider FCIFs that satisfy axioms FC and FI.
1. Dictatorial is not the only FCIF such that F J : P * * * → F * * * .
2. Dictatorial is the only FCIF such that F J : P * → F * * or F J : P * * → F * * , and there is no FCIF such that F J : P * * * → F * * .
3. Dictatorial is the only FCIF such that F J : P * → F * , and there is no FCIF such that F J : P * * → F * or F J : P * * * → F * .
Proof.
1. We represent with |P i | > the number of p j (i)s that are larger than 0.5 and with |P i | < the number of those less than 0.5 in a profile P ∈ P. Now we consider the following FCIF:
This FCIF verifies FC and FI and is not the Dictatorial FCIF.
2. We denote with |f P J | > the number of f P J (i)s larger or equal to 0.5 while |f P J | < are those less than 0.5 in the membership function f ∈ F. We say that a coalition L ⊆ N is fuzzy semidecisive for agent i, if the following conditions are satisfied for every profile P ∈ P:
[for all j ∈ L, p j (i) ≥ 0.5 and for all j / ∈ L, p j (i) < 0.5] ⇒ f P j (i) ≥ 0.5 (1) and
[for all j ∈ L, p j (i) < 0.5 and for all j / ∈ L, p j (i) > 0.5] ⇒ f P j (i) < 0.5.
(2) A coalition L ⊆ N is called fuzzy semidecisive if it is fuzzy semidecisive for every agent i in N. Analogously, we say that L ⊆ N is fuzzy decisive over agent i if the following conditions are satisfied for every profile P ∈ P:
[for all j ∈ L, p j (i) ≥ 0.5] ⇒ f P j (i) ≥ 0.5 and [for all j ∈ L, p j (i) < 0.5] ⇒ f P j (i) < 0.5.
In the same way, L ⊆ N is said fuzzy decisive if it is fuzzy decisive for every agent i in N.
We will first prove the existence of a semidecisive coalition for an agent i, and then show that is semidecisive for all i ∈ N. Without loss of generality we start assuming that N = 3 (the result extends easily to That is, agent 1 is fuzzy semidecisive over 3.
Using the same argument, agent 1 is fuzzy semidecisive over herself. Then by definition L = {1} is fuzzy semidecisive. Now we show that the intersection of two fuzzy semidecisive coalitions is fuzzy semidecisive. First we prove that L ∩ L ′ = ∅. Suppose that this is not the case. 
Then we have that L = {1} is fuzzy semidecisive. We prove that given a coalition L ⊆ N, either L is fuzzy semidecisive or N \ L is fuzzy semidecisive. By FC, N is fuzzy semidecisive over N. Without loss of generality, fix L = {1, 2} and suppose by contradiction that L is not fuzzy semidecisive. Then it must exist a profile P and an individual i ∈ N, such that p 1 (i) ≥ 0.5, p 2 (i) ≥ 0.5, p 3 (i) < 0.5 and f P J (i) < 0.5; or p 1 (i) < 0.5, p 2 (i) < 0.5, p 3 (i) ≥ 0.5 and f P J (i) ≥ 0.5. Suppose the latter is the case, and let i = 1. By FI, for all P ∈ P, [p 1 (1) < 0.5, p 2 (1) < 0.5, p 3 (1) ≥ 0.5] ⇒ f P J (1) ≥ 0.5.
We want to prove that N \ L = {3} is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 1. To do this, we have to show that the following is the case: Then it must be that case that f P 1 J (1) ≥ 0.5, and by FI, for all P ∈ P, Then we have that N \ L = {3} is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 1. Finally we obtain that L = {3} is fuzzy semidecisive for N. Now we prove that if a coalition L is fuzzy semidecisive, with |L| > 1, the subsets and suprasets of L are also fuzzy semidecisive. Let L ⊆ L ′ ⊆ N, with L fuzzy semidecisive. If L ′ is not fuzzy semidecisive, then N \ L ′ is fuzzy semidecisive. But then L ⊆ L ′ , (N \ L ′ ) ∩ L = ∅, contradicting our previous proof. Thus L ′ must be fuzzy semidecisive over N. Now consider h ∈ L. If L \ {h} is fuzzy semidecisive, the result is proved. If not, we have that N \ (L \ {h}) is fuzzy semidecisive. Then we have that N \ (L \ {h}) ∩ L = {h}. The next step is to prove that there always exists an agent h ∈ N such that {h} is fuzzy semidecisive. By FC, N is fuzzy semidecisive, thus there exists L ′ ⊆ N such that N \ L ′ is fuzzy semidecisive. Then there must exist L ′′ such that (N \ L ′ ) \ L ′′ is fuzzy semidecisive. Because N is finite, by iterating this process we find an h ∈ N that is fuzzy semidecisive over N. Finally we prove that if a coalition L ⊆ N is fuzzy semidecisive, then it is fuzzy decisive. For that, consider a fuzzy semidecisive coalition L ⊆ N. Then there exists h ∈ L that is fuzzy semidecisive over N. Without loss of generality, suppose that h = 1. Suppose that {1} is not fuzzy decisive for agent 2.
Then it must exist a profile P such that Otherwise, we can repeat the previous argument and show that {3} is fuzzy semidecisive over N, which would lead us to a contradiction since {1} ∩ {3} = ∅. Because 1 ∈ L, we have that L is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 3.
Finally, a similar argument shows that L is fuzzy decisive for all i ∈ N. So we have that whenever a FCIF verifies FC and FI, there must exist an agent fuzzy decisive over N. The impossibility of a FCIF is proved by set inclusion, since the Dictatorial FCIF does not verify the hypothesis in P * * * → F * * .
3. The proof is similar to (2) . We see in the following example that the aggregator proposed in part 1 of Theorem 3 is not the Dictatorial FCIF. When we use the crisp version of the Independence axiom, we find a similar result using an analogous proof. The fuzzy structure provides the opportunity to find non dictatorial rules. If a FCIF verifies I, f J (i) will only depend on the opinions p j (i). A function f : R k → R that verifies min{a 1 , . . . , a k } ≤ f (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ≤ max{a 1 , . . . , a k } is called a k-dimensional mean (Hajja, 2013) . A FCIF that verifies FC is then, a n-dimensional mean. The mean can yield different levels of "democracy", in the sense that the Dictatorial FCIF is a mean while the Democratic FCIF is also a mean. A natural question is whether every n-dimensional mean yields a fuzzy aggregation function.
The following example shows that the answer is negative. We obtain U(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N, a membership function that does not belong to F * * * .
Conclusion
In this work we analyze, from a fuzzy point of view, the Group Identification Problem. The opinions of the agents are no longer crisp statements about the membership or not to a group. Instead of that, their opinions are expressed in terms of degrees of membership to the class of Js. We presented the axioms that have been already analyzed in the literature and gave fuzzy versions of them. In the case of 'Liberal' aggregators, the uniqueness and impossibility results from K-R still remain. The axioms FL and FEL (L and EL) are very restrictive, and do not allow more rules other than the Strong Liberal FCIF. When we deal with the 'Dictatorial' aggregator, the results are richer than in the crisp version, due to the different interpretations that we may give to the domain and range conditions postulated in K-R. Depending on the goals of the social planner we can have several, just one or no rules satisfying the desired properties. The binary nature of determining if someone has more or less than 0.5 degree of acceptance, leads in general to the preservation of the uniqueness and impossibility results. However, when we modify the domain and range of the FCIFs, we get the possibility of choosing more rules than just the Dictatorial one.
